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Lord Rothermere and Hungarian Revisionism1 
Éva Mathey 
The dismemberment of historic Hungary after World War I was an 
unparalleled tragedy for the Hungarian nation. Revisionism, therefore, 
provided a powerful unifying force for the Horthy regime between the 
world wars. Consequently, the rectification of Hungary’s prewar frontiers 
was the most important national concern.  
Revisionism generated an extensive literature, including books, 
pamphlets, leaflets, in various languages.
2
 In Hungarian revisionist 
literature, besides some recurrent themes such as Hungary’s role in the 
war, and rejection of responsibility for it and the war-guilt theory; 
Hungary and her relations to the Wilsonian peace; the injustices of 
Trianon; the political and economic necessity of treaty revision for the 
stability of Europe, one of the most often discussed issues was the role of 
the “opposing camp,”3 (that is Britain, France, Italy and the United States 
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by the opposing camp which, after so many vows and promises, has become a first cla
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of America) who practically made the Treaty of Trianon, in righting the 
injustices done to Hungary. This was also underlined by the critical views 
concerning the Treaty of Trianon advocated by some of the 
representatives of the British, French, Italian, and American political and 
intellectual elite. 
As early as 1919, there were already some indications that several 
influential politicians, such as David Lloyd George
4
 and Francesco Nitti, 
realized the problems with the peace terms for Hungary. During the 
interwar period the number of those who criticized the Hungarian peace 
treaty grew. By early 1920 an increasing number of British officials voiced 
their criticism. Admiral E. T. Troubridge, commander of the Allied flotilla 
on the Danube; Sir William Goode, director of Relief Missions; and Sir 
George Clerk, head of a special Allied mission to Hungary and Sir Thomas 
Hohler, the first British diplomatic representative in Hungary after the war, 
also complained about the proposed peace terms for Hungary, and, thus, 
prospects for central Europe. Members of the British Parliament (Lord 
Bryce, Sir Donald McLean, Lord Cavendish Bentinck, Lord Newton, Lord 
Montague, Lord Asquith, Lord Sydenham and others) also brought the 
question of Hungary into discussion, and both houses of the British 
parliament gave considerable attention to Hungary.
5
 Another well-known 
critic of the postwar system, John Maynard Keynes, in The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace, attacked the peace based on long-term 
economic considerations and explained that it would shake the 
                                                                                                                        
ss mental concern.” A Budapesti Hírlap editorial commented on in Wright’s Memoran
dum to Secretary of State on “Hungarian Affairs in November 1928,” December 6, 19
28. Roll# 10 M708 RG59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 
4
 In his Fontainebleau Memorandum on March 25, 1919, Lloyd George stated: “What I 
have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be peace 
in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Ma
gyar Irredenta within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the pea
ce that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their mothe
rlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strat
egy or economics or communications which can usually be adjusted by other means.” Q
uoted in Thomas L. Sakmyster, “Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon,” 
in Béla Király, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, eds., War and Society in East Central Europe. 
Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon (New Y
ork: Columbia University Press, 1982), 119. Hereafter cited as Sakmyster, “Great Britain 
and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon.” 
5
 For more detail see Robert Donald, The Tragedy of Trianon: Hungary’s Appeal to Hu
manity (London: T. Butterworth Ltd., 1928). 
245 
“inextricably intertwined” economic bonds among the nations of Central 
Europe and will cause the system to fall, thus “endanger[ing] the life of 
Europe altogether.”6 Although Keynes’ work focused on the repercussions 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the book generally criticized the peace structure 
and, therefore, enjoyed popularity in Hungary. Similarly to Jacques 
Bainville’s book titled Les Conséquences politiques de la paix which also 
pointed out the political shortcomings of the peace settlement and predicted 
with accuracy its political consequences.
7
 
Anything that foreigners said about the necessity of treaty revision 
“was, of course, seized upon eagerly.”8 These opinions became 
represented, as well as misrepresented. These utterances underlined the 
Hungarian belief that the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was possible. 
A British example, one of the most noted foreign contributions to 
revision, also demonstrates this. The media magnate Lord Rothermere’s 
press campaign gave popular revisionism in Hungary new energies.  
In the summer of 1927 Hungarian revisionism received a surprise 
boost from abroad. On June 21, 1927 British press magnate Lord 
Rothermere launched an all-out anti-Trianon press campaign in his 
newspaper, the Daily Mail. In his writings, of which the best-known one 
was “Hungary’s Place In the Sun,” Rothermere pointed out the injustices 
and the mistakes in the treaty and demanded the return to Hungary of the 
areas with clear Hungarian majorities.
9
 Conducted on the pages of a daily 
paper, Rothermere’s campaign unquestionably put the Hungarian 
question into the focus of attention in Britain. Furthermore, the 
Rothermere campaign closely intertwined with revisionist propaganda for 
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the Hungarian cause in the US: the Kossuth Pilgrimage to New York in 
1928 and the Justice for Hungary movement were two of its direct results 
in America. In Hungary, the Territorial Revisionist League was 
established and began to publish a series of studies in Great Britain and 
France on treaty revision. Rothermere also had a formative influence on 
launching the Hungarian World Federation, which aimed to unite the 
Hungarians of the world on the platform of revisionism.
10
 
Prime Minister István Bethlen, not fully pleased with the 
Rothermere concept of revision, explicitly distanced himself and his 
government from Rothermere’s action, and he judged Rothermere’s 
campaign ill-timed and unfortunate. The correspondence of Baron Iván 
Rubido-Zichy, Hungarian minister to London, also testifies to this fact.
11
 
Still, free propaganda was useful in retaining and reinforcing revisionist 
sentiments in Hungary and abroad alike.
12
  
As Prime Minister Bethlen commented: 
Of course, I am very glad that British public opinion is intently 
discussing the problem of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The 
Hungarian Government is, however, in no way connected with Lord 
Rothermere’s action, as far as I know not one member of the 
Government has had intercourse with Lord Rothermere in regard to this 
matter. Furthermore, the point of view of the Hungarian Government in 
this matter is well known: we have no intention of at present demanding 
the revision of the Peace Treaty because in our opinion the situation is 
not yet ripe for this purpose. The public opinion of the world must 
demand consideration of this matter and we are only endeavoring to 
encourage this method of approach by constant but honest information 
and propaganda to be carried on by Hungarian society in general and the 
world press.
13
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British official circles had a definite interest in preserving the 
postwar status quo and “so far as His Majesty’s Government [was] 
concerned” official Britain also distanced itself from the Rothermere 
campaign and “belittle[d] [its] effect.”14 Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin’s remark, “Can you imagine anything more dangerous and 
irresponsible?” is an expressive and conclusive judgment of the lord’s 
action.
15
 On the other hand, Lord Rothermere won many prominent 
British politicians over to the Hungarian cause, among them Lord 
Newton, who became an ardent advocate of the Hungarian question in the 
British parliament.
16
 
While official circles distanced themselves from Rothermere’s 
campaign, and his actions did not yield any political results, ”Radomír 
apó,” as he was popularly called, enjoyed the respect and admiration of 
the Hungarian people, and became the hero of the day.
17
 Rothermere was 
seen as the “savior” of Hungary. Hungarians collected one million 
signatures in support of Rothermere’s action which were bound in 
albums, and presented to him in the summer of 1927 in a spectacular 
London celebration.
18
 Songs and poems were written in tribute to him, 
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and a memorial was erected in his honor.
19
 He was awarded several 
honorary degrees and positions; for example, he became the Doctor 
Honoris Causa of Szeged University. And when Rothermere’s son, 
Esmond Harmsworth, visited Hungary in May 1928, he and his 
delegation were received as royalty.
20
 Hungarian enthusiasm about 
Rothermere’s campaign reached irrational heights when he was invited to 
the Hungarian throne by legitimist circles in Hungary.
21
  
Lord Rothermere’s political campaign had an influence overseas as 
well, when he won over many Americans and Hungarian-Americans after 
his unofficial visit to the United States in the winter of 1927–1928. While 
official America ignored him, Hungarian-American communities 
welcomed the Englishman as the savior of Hungary. He became popular 
with “the [Hungarian-American] man of the street and of the press.”22 His 
eloquent, enthusiastic and highly emotional argumentation stressed the 
responsibility of the United States in creating an unjust peace and 
appealed to the American liberal and democratic tradition. He had great 
influence on his audience by reciting popular slogans such as, for 
example, that “Trianon was born in the US” and made them believe that 
“Hungary’s future will be decided in the United States;”23 an argument 
that seemed obvious to some people, but the objective basis of such 
reasoning was rather unsound. 
The American Legation in Hungary continuously informed the State 
Department about issues relating to Rothermere’s campaign, as well as 
about the press coverage it received both in Hungary and abroad, with 
special respect to the successor states. State Department documents make 
it clear that Rothermere’s eccentric activities were deemed unfortunate and 
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harmful, and encouraged false hopes.
24
 American minister to Hungary, 
Joshua Butler Wright’s somewhat harsh judgment concerning Hungarian 
tendencies to overestimate the significance of the Rothermere’s campaign 
reflects the official American attitudes toward revisionism. That Wright 
kept a shrewd eye on Hungarian affairs, especially on revisionist 
propaganda, is best demonstrated by his following comment: considering 
the extent to which the Hungarians believed that their difficulties 
interested the rest of the world, “[o]ne gains the impression,” Wright said,  
that these people are convinced that Hungary is an important factor in 
the general European policy of England and other great Powers; this is 
bred from their intense national spirit and love of country, which, I 
believe, is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. It is therefore to be 
regretted that they appear to be blind to the ill-effects of this untimely 
agitation.
25
 
Lord Rothermere’s activities in the US triggered two systematic 
anti-Trianon campaigns: the Kossuth pilgrimage to New York in 1928 
and the Justice for Hungary movement in 1931.  
At the corner of the Riverside Drive and 113
th
 Street, there stands 
the second statue erected in the US in commemoration of Lajos Kossuth. 
Hungarians, Americans and Hungarian-Americans alike supported the 
creation of the statue, which was unveiled on March 15, 1928, during a 
spectacular ceremony. For the occasion, a delegation of approximately 
500 Hungarians, the so-called Kossuth pilgrimage, arrived in New York, 
representing almost all layers and social classes of contemporary 
Hungarian society. The pilgrimage was explicitly declared to be a strictly 
unofficial social and cultural mission and any connections to government 
or other official or semi-official circles in Hungary were repeatedly 
denied. That notwithstanding, the Kossuth pilgrimage was a systematic 
anti-Trianon propaganda campaign in the US. With Kossuth’s moral and 
political reputation as the basis for it, the participants of the Kossuth 
pilgrimage took every opportunity to speak up for the inevitability of the 
revision of the Treaty of Trianon  
The erection of the Kossuth statue was a symbolic act. Kossuth 
generated an image of Hungarians as a freedom-fighting, freedom-loving 
and democratic nation and it enjoyed a revival during the interwar years. 
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Kossuth, often called “the Hungarian Washington,” came to symbolize 
democratic and liberal values the American and Hungarian nations were 
thought to have shared. Such an imagined historical-cultural bond gained 
special significance in the context of Trianon inasmuch as Kossuth’s 
political and moral legacy was used to support Hungary’s cause.  
The Kossuth pilgrimage was also linked to the activities of the 
Hungarian Revisionist League, a significant non-government ‘propaganda 
agency’ established on July 27, 1927 as an immediate outcome of Lord 
Rothermere’s campaign. The League, in order to gain the widest possible 
publicity for Hungary’s problem, set up branches abroad. The US capital 
gave home to the American branch, and Imre Jósika-Herceg was 
appointed its head.
26
 Both Jósika-Herceg, the chairman of the pilgrims’ 
reception committee, and Ferenc Herceg, the president of the League in 
Budapest, were ardent promoters of the pilgrimage, and took their fair 
share in its preparation and organization, and, thus, the propaganda work 
for revision in the US. 
A better-known anti-Trianon campaign was the famous trans-
Atlantic flight, popularly known as the “Justice for Hungary” movement 
in 1931. After Charles Lindbergh’s achievement in 1927, a prosperous era 
of aviation came and dozens of adventurous pilots of all nationalities tried 
to repeat Lindbergh’s feat. Hungarians were no exception to this rule. In 
the summer of 1931 György Endresz and Sándor Magyar made history by 
becoming the first Hungarians to fly across the Atlantic non-stop. Money 
was raised both by Hungarians (the insignificant amount of $45) and the 
Hungarian-American community ($5,000) to help the fulfillment of the 
ocean flight. Imre Emil Szalay, a well-off Hungarian-American 
entrepreneur, offered a generous contribution of $25,000 which was 
indispensable in securing the firm financial background for the project.
27
 
Finally, the Lockheed could depart from Harbor Grace, New York on July 
15, 1931. Endresz and Magyar managed to cover the distance of 5770 
kilometers almost in 26 hours, thereby setting a number of records.
28
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Although they had to make a forced landing in Bicske some 30 kilometers 
from their planned destination in Budapest partly due to unexpected 
technical problems and shortage of fuel, the pilots received the hail due to 
the heroes of the nation.
29
 While their flight was momentous per se, its 
significance was increased by the fact that the flight served propaganda 
purposes. Upon Lord Rothermere’s advice, who offered 10,000 dollars 
for the Hungarian pilot who would manage to fly across the Atlantic, the 
plane was named Justice for Hungary.
30
 So, the flight besides the triumph 
of man and technology was a project to call attention to Hungary’s 
seriously troubled political and economic status under the Treaty of 
Trianon.
31
 Since the Justice for Hungary flight received fairly extensive 
media coverage, Hungarian revisionism got some international attention 
again.
32
 This was, however, quite short-lived. The Hungarian ocean flight, 
only temporarily and by mere coincidence, diverted attention from other 
issues of more serious nature, as was the economic and banking crisis 
which hit Hungary in July 1931.
33
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